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Most agent products that touch on-chain execution die in review, not in development, because giving an agent a signer creates a liability nobody wants to sign off on. LI.FI’s agent surface is read-only by construction, so the capability ships and the signing authority stays inside infrastructure you already control.

What this changes for your product

The feature clears review

There is no path from the tool surface to a signature, so the risk your security team is assessing is a quote request rather than an unbounded transaction.

An agent that doesn't guess

Statuses, errors, and partial outcomes are published as decision procedures, which is the difference between an agent that survives a demo and one you can leave running.

Minutes to a working prototype

The hosted server is a config paste with no installation, so you find out whether the product idea works before you have staffed it.

Lower cost per agent run

The LI.FI CLI returns the same capability in compact text rather than raw JSON, which spends fewer tokens on every call in a loop.
An agent calling read-only LI.FI tools, receiving an unsigned request, and a signing boundary before your own signer

The tools are read only. The boundary is where signing happens.

Why the usual approach stalls

Giving an agent on-chain capability usually means giving it a signer, and a signer is a permanent liability. Anything that reaches the agent’s context, including a token name it read off a page, is now one reasoning step away from a transaction. A bad trade is the smaller problem. The larger one is that you can’t put a ceiling on how bad one could be, which is the version of the question a risk owner has to answer before you launch. The narrower problem underneath is that most APIs are designed for a developer reading documentation, not for a model choosing between branches. An agent hitting an ambiguous status value or an undocumented error has nothing deterministic to fall back on, so it guesses, and a guess in an execution path is a bug you find in production.

Where signing happens

The hosted MCP server exposes cross-chain routing as tools an agent discovers and calls: chains, tokens, quotes, allowances, status. Every one of them is read-only. The server doesn’t sign and doesn’t broadcast. A quote comes back as an unsigned transaction request, and signing it happens outside, in your own wallet infrastructure, under your own rules.
That single design choice is what makes the rest safe to reason about. A prompt injection that reaches the agent reaches a quote request. It doesn’t reach a transaction.
Setup is a config paste, not an integration:
That works in any MCP-compatible host with no installation. See Installation for host-specific setup.
Without a key the server runs on a public rate limit of 200 requests every two hours, which is enough to build against and not enough to run on. A key raises it to 200 requests a minute.

Written to be read by a model

The rest of the agent surface exists because agents consume documentation differently from people. There is a machine-readable index of the docs without the HTML around it, a discovery file so a host can find the capability on its own, and a full API specification. More usefully, the parts an agent has to get right are published as decision procedures rather than prose.

Five-call recipe

The minimum ordered sequence covering discovery through confirmation.

Decision tables

Deterministic branching for every status a transfer can return: keep polling, treat as success, treat as a different asset delivered, treat as refunded, stop and report.

Error playbooks

Each failure mapped to its cause, whether a retry is appropriate, and what to say to the user.
LI.FI’s capabilities are also published as pre-built agent skills on the main agent skill directories, so cross-chain execution can be added as a native capability instead of one you write.

What to decide before launch

Enforce it at the signer rather than in the prompt. A prompt can be talked out of a rule, and a signing policy can’t.
An agent that can request a quote of any size will eventually request one, and the only place that becomes harmless is the layer the agent can’t reach.
A transfer that completes with a different but related asset delivered is a success at the protocol level and may be a failure at the plan level, and the agent needs that distinction encoded rather than inferred. See Partial completion.
Both answers work. What doesn’t work is an agent that retries a funding action without recording that it did.

Where to start

Point an MCP-compatible host at the hosted server and ask it to price a cross-chain move. That takes a minute and tells you more about the shape of the integration than any amount of reading. Then build the signing side, which is the part that stays yours: address policy, limits, and approval.

MCP server overview

Hosted setup, available tools, and rate limits.

Agent integration

The call sequence, decision tables, and error playbooks.

Available tools

Full reference for every MCP tool.

Execution workflows

Approvals, execution, and status recovery for an agent loop.

Talk to the LI.FI team

Bring your agent’s call volume and the flows you want it to run. We scope an API key and the limits that fit.